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Abstract 
Autonomous machines are moving rapidly from science fiction to science fact. The 
defining feature of this technology is that it can operate independently of human control.  
Consequently, society must consider how ‘decisions’ are to be made by autonomous 
machines.  The matter is particularly acute in circumstances where harm is inevitable no 
matter what course of action is taken. This dilemma has been identified in the context of 
autonomous vehicles driving under the regulation of domestic law and, there, 
governments seem to be moving towards a utilitarian solution to inevitable harm. This 
leads one to question whether utilitarianism should be transposed into the context of 
autonomous weapons which might soon operate on the battlefield under the gaze of 
humanitarian law. The argument here is that it should because humanitarian law 
includes the core principle of ‘proportionality’, which is fundamentally a utilitarian 
concept – requiring that any gain derived from an attack outweighs the harm caused. 
However, while human soldiers are always able to come to a view on proportionality, 
albeit subjective, there is much doubt over how an autonomous weapon might determine 
what is proportionate.  There is a very large gap between our embryonic understanding of 
utilitarianism in relation to autonomous vehicles manoeuvring around a city on one 
hand; and what would be required for armed robots patrolling a battlespace on the other. 
Bridging this gap is fraught with difficulty but perhaps the best starting point is to take 
Bentham’s expression of utilitarian mechanics and build upon them. With conscious 
effort and, ideally, collaboration, states could use the process of applying his classic 
theory to this very modern problem to raise the standard of protection offered to those 
caught up in conflict.   
 
Introduction 
‘Suppose there is a driver of a runaway tram which he can only steer from one narrow 
track on to another; five men are working on one track and one man on the other; 
anyone on the track he enters is bound to be killed.’1 
The above extract is the classic iteration of the ‘tram problem’ and was posed by 
Foot to demonstrate the ethical conundrum that arises in situations where harm of some 
																																								 																				
* The author is a Teaching Fellow at Newcastle Law School (elliot.winter@newcastle.ac.uk). The article 
is dedicated to the memory of Dr James Upcher. 
1  Foot, P, “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect” in Foot, P, ed, Virtues and 
Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (University of California Press 1978). T
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sort is inevitable, and where a decision must be made to determine which harm is 
allowed to manifest. In recent years, the problem has come back into focus with the rise 
of ‘autonomous’ technology where, instead of a human being having to decide whether 
to pull the proverbial lever, it will be left to a machine to make the call. The matter is 
perhaps of greatest moment in the context of autonomous vehicles where manufacturers 
and governments alike are struggling to come up with definite solutions to this most 
vexed of problems.  The earliest indication available is that states might move towards a 
utilitarian solution to the tram problem when it comes to autonomous vehicles.2   
Of course, autonomous technology is not confined to vehicles. The principal 
question for present purposes is whether a utilitarian solution is right for ‘autonomous 
weapons’.  These are machines that can act independently in the battlespace and whose 
deployment inherently involves artificial intelligence assuming some degree of 
responsibility for critical assessments.3  Such weapons used in an international armed 
conflict will be governed by humanitarian law, a core principle of which is 
‘proportionality’.  In essence, this principle requires that the harm caused by an attack 
must not exceed the gain garnered from it. While the concept itself is clear, the 
practicalities of determining whether harm exceeds gain in any particular scenario are 
not.   
This article will explain that the best starting point is to recognise that the 
principle of proportionality is analogous to the principle of utility – the former requiring 
more gain than harm; the latter more pleasure than pain.  From there, it becomes clear 
that the various mechanisms developed by Bentham in the eighteenth century to enable 
application of utilitarianism can now be carried over and used to apply proportionality.4 
Of course, these mechanisms must be taken from their abstract form and given more 
concrete meaning based on the sorts of harm and gain that might be expected to arise in 
the context of armed conflict. Thereafter, the matter can be passed to policy makers, 
military officials and computer programmers to create algorithms that can implement the 
relevant mechanisms on the battlefield. This process presents an opportunity for states, 
acting alone or in concert, to hold this emerging technology to tougher standards than 
presently demanded by humanitarian law. Indeed, amid failure to achieve an outright 
ban on autonomous weapons, this is perhaps the best compromise available. 
It should be noted that the ambit of this article is strictly limited. Proportionality 
will be considered only in its humanitarian law (or jus in bello) sense and as it would apply 
in the context of an international armed conflict. Proportionality in its other myriad 
contexts, such as jus ad bellum, jus post bellum, human rights and so on, will not be 
considered as, in those areas, it has evolved with nuanced differences in meaning.5  
Similarly, there are other rules of humanitarian law which have a bearing on the use of 
autonomous weapons.  For example, the rule of ‘distinction’ is a fundamental rule which 
requires parties to a conflict to discern military objectives from civilians and civilian 
objects.6 Clearly, distinguishing targets from non-targets is a prerequisite of any 
proportionality assessment; however, that is a separate issue for another article, as is the 
ethical nature (or otherwise) of an attack by a machine.7 Finally, the article will not 
																																								 																				
2  As will be explained below, Germany is the first state to head in this direction.  
3  The working definition proposed by the US for autonomous weapons is supplied below. 
4  Bentham, J, The Principles of Morals and Legislation (Prometheus Books 1988).   
5  For full discussion of proportionality, see Newton, M and May, L, Proportionality in International Law 
(Oxford University Press 2014).   
6  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, Article 48 [Additional Protocol I]. 
7  See Leveringhaus, A, Ethics and Autonomous Weapons (Palgrave Pivot 2016). 
Autonomous Weapons in Humanitarian Law: Understanding the Technology, Its__  
Compliance with the Principle of Proportionality and the Role of Utilitarianism_____	
185 
attempt to specify what the final algorithms should look like, only to elucidate one 
principle underpinning them.   
 
I. The Technology 
A. Understanding autonomous weapons 
Humanity’s level of technological sophistication continues to grow at an exponential rate 
and much innovation can currently be found in the area of automation. Indeed, Bagrit 
predicted decades ago that we would witness an ‘age of automation’ where machines 
increasingly take over activities performed by humans.8 The autonomy phenomenon can 
be encountered in factory production processes, vehicular transportation and even space 
exploration, but there are also important developments in military technology. It is 
important to grasp the meaning, novelty and significance of autonomy in military 
technology to understand why it has prompted the present line of enquiry.   
The starting point is to define what is meant by ‘autonomy’, yet this effort can 
quickly deteriorate into a confusing metaphysical conundrum. Donne observed that ‘no 
man is an island, entire of itself’9 and the same holds true for autonomous weapons 
which are never completely autonomous – there will always be dependence on some 
external element such as other machines or soldiers in the field, intelligence operatives 
scouting locations, trainers or programmers at base and so on.10 Furthermore, as 
Bradshaw et al put it, autonomy is not a ‘unidimensional concept’ (which, at its simplest, 
could be said to be comprised of self-direction and self-sufficiency) and instead has a 
broad range of potential meanings.11 As a result of these considerations, states and 
academics have grown less enthusiastic about trying to define autonomy and there is 
therefore no accepted international definition of what constitutes an autonomous 
weapon.  Nonetheless, in 2012, the US Department of Defense adopted a useful working 
definition providing that an autonomous weapon is a ‘weapon system that, once 
activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human 
operator.’12 This definition was widely cited and certainly manages to capture the essence 
of what is meant by an autonomous weapon for the purposes of this article: namely, a 
machine that can be assembled with hardware, imbued with software and then released 
into the battlespace to perform its function independently. The point is that it is the 
absence of direct human involvement in operation that most clearly separates 
autonomous weapons from the more familiar technology found in ‘drones’ which, while 
‘unmanned’, are still piloted by a human, albeit from a distant military base.13 This 
distinction has led one of the leading actors in humanitarian law, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, to comment that the deployment of autonomous weapons 
represents a ‘paradigm shift’ in the way hostilities are conducted.14  
																																								 																				
8  Bagrit, L, “The Age of Automation” 17(1) British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (1966) 80. 
9  Alford, H, ed, The Works of John Donne, Volume III (John W Parker 1839) 574-575.  
10  United States Department of Defense, Task Force Report: The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems, 19 July 
2012, 59, at <bit.ly/2pwXT9C> (accessed 20 March 2018) [Task Force Report]. 
11  Bradshaw, JM, Hoffman, RR, Johnson, M and Woods, DD, “The Seven Deadly Myths of 
‘Autonomous Systems’” 28(3) IEEE Intelligent Systems (2013) 54.    
12   United States Department of Defense Directive, “Autonomy in Weapons Systems”, Number 3000.09 of 
21 November 2012, Glossary, Part II (“Autonomy in Weapons Systems”). 
13  For a full analysis of the problems posed by drones, see Casey-Maslen, S, “Pandora’s box? Drone 
strikes under jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and international human rights law” 94 International Review of the 
Red Cross (2012) 597. 
14  International Committee of the Red Cross, Autonomous weapon systems - Q&A, 2014, at <bit.ly/2ixib2p> 
(accessed 20 March 2018). 
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Of course, weapons with limited autonomy have already been employed widely 
by states for defensive purposes – even a landmine could be said to fulfil the basic 
requirements.  On a more sophisticated level, there are sentry guns and missile 
interception technologies that repel incoming targets without the need for any additional 
human authorisation such as ‘Phalanx’ and ‘Super aEgis-II’.15  However, when it comes 
to the more offensive, advanced and mobile technologies that are the focus of this article, 
states have been much more cautious.  For potential examples, one might consider 
‘Taranis’, an aerial combat vehicle being developed by BAE Systems plc (a UK-based 
aerospace manufacturer), or ‘Atlas’, a humanoid-like machine being developed by 
Boston Dynamics (a US-based private robotics company).16 In short, although we are yet 
to see the completion of any ‘offensive’ autonomous weapons, there seems little doubt 
from a technical perspective that they will soon be available. 
 
B. The inevitable deployment of autonomous weapons 
Of course, the mere availability of a particular technology does not necessarily mean that 
states must employ it.  For example, ‘blinding laser weapons’ were developed in the late 
twentieth century but were pre-emptively banned by a protocol to the Conventional 
Weapons Convention.17  Turning to autonomous weapons, the official line of a number 
of states at present is that ‘critical decisions’ (ie decisions to strike) will not be delegated 
to a machine and that there will always be a human ‘in the loop’ (to authorise a strike) or 
‘on the loop’ (with the ability to abort it).  Most recently, in its (somewhat overdue) 2017 
Joint Doctrine Publication, the Ministry of Defence confirmed that ‘current UK policy is 
that the operation of our weapons will always be under human control as an absolute 
guarantee of human oversight and authority and of accountability for weapon usage.’18  
The US, for its part, had earlier affirmed that ‘autonomous … weapons systems shall be 
designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human 
judgment over the use of force.’19    
However, scratch beneath the surface and these assertions become less 
convincing.  The UK has opted to set a very high bar when defining what would actually 
constitute an ‘autonomous system’ in requiring that it would need to be ‘capable of 
understanding higher-level intent and direction.’20  Of course, as discussed below, there is 
no suggestion of machines such as Taranis or Atlas being able to genuinely ‘understand’ 
what is going on around them – that level of artificial intelligence remains confined to 
science fiction.  Therefore, the UK has deftly created a lacuna within which to develop 
weapons that it does not consider to be ‘autonomous’.  Similarly, the US language of 
‘appropriate levels of human judgment’ is deliberately ambiguous and has been heavily 
criticised on the basis that, in some cases, the ‘appropriate’ level of human judgment may 
																																								 																				
15  Raytheon, Last Line of Defense for Air, Land and Sea, at <raytheon.com/capabilities/products/phalanx> 
(accessed 21 April 2018); Dodaam, Combat Robot (Lethal), at <dodaam.com/eng/sub2/ 
menu2_1_4.php> (accessed 21 April 2018). 
16   BAE Systems, Taranis, at <baesystems.com/en/product/taranis> (accessed 21 April 2018); Boston 
Dynamics, Atlas, at <bostondynamics.com/atlas> (accessed 21 April 2018). 
17  Protocol IV to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which 
May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (1980) 1342 UNTS 137, Article 1. 
18  United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre), Joint Doctrine 
Publication 0-30.2, Unmanned Aircraft Systems, August 2017, 42, at <bit.ly/2pvFQkn> (accessed 20 March 
2018) [Joint Doctrine Publication]. 
19    “Autonomy in Weapons Systems”, supra nt 12, 2. 
20  Joint Doctrine Publication, supra nt 18, 13. 
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be none at all.21  Indeed, recently, a US Department of Defense report has recommended 
that the US must accelerate its exploitation of autonomy on the basis that, inter alia, 
autonomous technology will ‘increase the quality and speed of decisions in time-critical 
operations.’22  It is difficult to see how there can be space for any human judgment in 
such ‘time-critical’ cases – rather the implication seems to be that the quality of the 
determination will be higher without human meddling. Keeping the door ajar for 
autonomous weapons is not unique to the West.  The Russian Federation made it clear 
in a recent position paper that, until there are working examples of autonomous 
weapons, any regulation is premature and that to stifle the development would be to 
preclude a whole range of associated technologies that are emerging thanks to 
automation and that are legitimate and desirable.23   
The reluctance of states to act decisively on autonomous weapons has bled into 
proceedings at the UN. It had been decided unanimously in December 2016 at the UN’s 
Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to establish a 
Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to discuss autonomous weapons. Although the 
GGE was formed, and talks are indeed being held, very little progress has been made.  
After being postponed from April 2017, the first meeting in November failed to deliver 
much in the way of tangible progress and, in the words of one commentator, deteriorated 
into ‘a chaotic and ultimately inconsequential discussion of AI generally.’24 Indeed, the 
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, a leading NGO, went so far as to call the whole of 2017 
a ‘lost year for diplomacy’ and has also criticised the decision to hold further meetings 
across ten days in April and August 2018 as ‘unambitious’ and observed that it was 
‘unlikely to result in significant steps forward’.25 All of this diplomatic hesitation is 
encapsulated by the fact, at present, only twenty two states have signalled their support 
for a ban and none of these are global military powers.26  This low number should also be 
read against a backdrop of ninety countries around the world operating unmanned 
aircraft – all of which could be augmented through the incorporation of autonomy.27 
Furthermore, there has not been any progress towards the looser sort of ‘standard of 
operation’, advocated by the likes of Kastan, that might act as a voluntary military 
manual for the use of autonomous weapons.28  
																																								 																				
21  Sauer, F, ‘‘Stopping ‘Killer Robots’: Why Now Is the Time to Ban Autonomous Weapons Systems”, 
Arms Control Association, October 2016, at <http://bit.ly/2Goa2rZ> (accessed 20 March 2018). 
22  United States Department of Defense, Report of the Defense Science Board Summer Study on Autonomy, 
Washington DC, 1 June 2016, 1, at <bit.ly/2Goa2rZ> (accessed 20 March 2018) [Report of the Defense 
Science Board]. 
23  Russian Federation, Examination of various dimensions of emerging technologies in the area of lethal 
autonomous weapons systems, in the context of the objectives and purposes of the Convention, 
CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.8, 10 November 2017, at <bit.ly/2ufPjSx> (accessed 20 March 2018).  
24  Tucker, P, “Russia to the United Nations: Don’t Try to Stop Us from Building Killer Robots” Defense 
One, 21 November 2017, at <bit.ly/2B7J8yc> (accessed 20 March 2018).   
25  Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, 2017: A Lost Year for Diplomacy, 22 December 2017, at 
<bit.ly/2ptumi3> (accessed 20 March 2018). 
26  Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy 
See, Iraq, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, State of Palestine, Uganda, Venezuela and 
Zimbabwe. 
27  Sayler, K, “A World of Proliferated Drones: A Technology Primer” Center for a New American Security, 
10 June 2015, at <bit.ly/2G1kR3Q> (accessed 20 March 2018). 
28  Kastan, B, “Autonomous Weapons Systems: A Coming Legal Singularity?” 1 Journal of Law, Technology 
and Policy (2013) 45, 62. 
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In conclusion, it seems clear that Anderson and Waxman were correct in their 
prediction that the deployment of autonomous weapons is inevitable.29 There are many 
justifications for this conclusion ranging from the existing financial investment in the 
technology to the tactical benefits it offers. Ultimately, though, the reality is that the 
freedom to develop autonomous weapons is already viewed by the major military powers 
as a strategic imperative.  As Vladimir Putin said, ‘artificial intelligence is the future, not 
only for Russia, but for all humankind … Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will 
become the ruler of the world.’30 
 
C. The limits of autonomous cognition 
Assuming what has been said above is correct and that the deployment of autonomous 
weapons is indeed inevitable, we must deal with the full spectrum of challenges that it 
presents. For the purposes of this article, the focus is on the principle of proportionality in 
humanitarian law and so this means grasping how autonomous weapons might arrive at 
proportionate determinations on the battlefield. This is problematic because, hitherto, the 
application of proportionality has revolved around the decisions of human combatants 
and so replacing these with determinations made by machines would appear to remove a 
key pillar upon which the principle is based. However, while it is indeed true that 
autonomous weapons pose some serious challenges, if one is to understand the proper 
extent of these challenges it is important to be realistic about what autonomous weapons 
will be able to do and what they will not be able to do. 
There are, of course, many science fiction books and films which depict 
autonomous machines, usually on the rampage, with human-levels of understanding of 
their environment. To some extent, this sort of background material has influenced 
academic consideration of the topic. For example, Wallach and Allen argue that society 
is on a quest to build a machine that can tell right from wrong with the effect that existing 
theories of ethics and agency are not adequate and, therefore, that we must begin 
constructing new conceptual frameworks to provide autonomous machines with even 
rudimentary ethical sensitivity.31  However, although there are research projects aimed at 
producing artificial intelligence which would be equivalent to human intelligence and 
capable of full moral agency, the attainment of this goal is estimated to be a long way off.  
To illustrate this, Müller surveyed hundreds of artificial intelligence experts at a series of 
conferences and asked, ‘by what year would you see a (10%; 50%; 90%) probability for 
… high level machine intelligence to exist?’.  The median response for 10% probability 
was 2022, the median response for 50% probability was 2040 and median response for 
90% probability was 2075.32 In short, according to artificial intelligence experts, advanced 
robot cognition is at least twenty years away.  
In the meantime, what we might realistically expect to see is a more superficial 
form of artificial intelligence that merely appears to make decisions. On this basis, it has 
been argued that autonomy is not ‘a widget or discrete component’ but rather a 
‘capability of the larger system enabled by the integration of human and machine 
																																								 																				
29  Anderson, K, and Waxman, MC, “Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon Systems: Why a Ban 
Won't Work and How the Laws of War Can” Stanford University The Hoover Institution (Jean Perkins Task 
Force on National Security and Law Essay Series), 10 April 2013, at <bit.ly/2pBFnO9> (accessed 20 March 
2018). 
30  Putin, V, Speech to Yasoslavl University, 1 September 2017, at <bit.ly/2Go1LUS> (accessed 20 March 
2018). 
31  Wallach, W and Allen, C, Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong (Oxford University Press 
2008). 
32  Müller, VC and Bostrom, N, “Future Progress in Artificial Intelligence: A Survey of Expert Opinion” in 
Müller, VC, ed, Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence (Springer 2016).   
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abilities.’33 The significance of this conclusion for present purposes cannot be overstated. 
It means that, even if machines physically replace humans on the battlefield, human 
judgment will remain essential to matters such as determinations on proportionality. In 
short, human judgments and values will be implemented by machines.  This has led 
Bradshaw et al to argue that the idea of an ‘autonomous system’ is a myth and what we 
are really dealing with are, at most, machines with limited autonomous capabilities.34  
This focuses the debate about autonomous weapons and brings it back from science 
fiction to reality. Machines would operate on the battlefield simply by carrying out 
calculations (albeit very complex ones), without having to understand what the overall 
concept of proportionality is actually about. 
 
D. Autonomous cognition in autonomous vehicles 
Given that, as a matter of technological limitation, autonomous cognition will for the 
next few decades only extend as far as the implementation of human judgments and 
values, society must begin to crystallise these into clear, objective, standards with which 
machines will be able to work. By way of comparative analysis, it is enlightening to 
explore how this issue is being handled in the context of autonomous vehicles.35 Interest 
in this technology has been intense and one prediction has driverless vehicles accounting 
for 40% of car manufacturers’ profits by 2035.36 Of course, such vehicles also face the 
conundrum of making determinations about harm with, in the example of an inevitable 
collision, either the occupant or a pedestrian being injured depending on what action the 
car takes. It should be noted that the recent tragedy in Arizona involving the death of a 
pedestrian in a crash with an autonomous Uber vehicle does not appear to have been the 
result of any ‘determination’ by the vehicle but, rather, a simple failure of its sensors to 
detect her. Of course, the investigation is only in its nascent stages.37 
Until very recently, there has been a legislative vacuum in this area and so it has 
been left to manufacturers to come up with their own views on what should happen in 
situations where harm must inevitably fall on someone. The first manufacturer to 
candidly set out its position on this issue was Mercedes-Benz. Speaking at the 2016 Paris 
Motor Show, the company’s manager of driver assistance systems, Christoph von Hugo, 
said, ‘If you know you can save at least one person, at least save that one. Save the one in 
the car.  If all you know for sure is that one death can be prevented, then that’s your first 
priority.’38 In other words, if there is a risk of death to both the driver and a third party 
outside the car, a Mercedes will simply prioritise the driver. The bluntness of this 
‘prioritisation’ approach is quite shocking but, on reflection, it should not be all that 
surprising.  Mercedes is in the business of selling cars and pleasing the people who buy 
them. Those people would, the company presumes, prefer that they and their families are 
prioritised over other road users no matter what. Indeed, there is empirical evidence to 
																																								 																				
33  Task Force Report, supra nt 10, 23. 
34   “Seven Deadly Myths”, supra nt 11, 54. 
35  For examples of autonomous car development see: Atiyeh, C, “Google’s Latest Search is for 
Automaker Partners” Car and Driver, 15 January 2016, at <bit.ly/2pFnfD7> (accessed 20 March 2018). 
36  Boston Consulting Group, “By 2035, New Mobility Tech Will Drive 40% of Auto Industry Profits”, 
Press Release, 11 January 2018, at <on.bcg.com/2I5bInu> (accessed 20 March 2018). 
37  National Transportation Safety Board, “NTSB Update: Uber Crash Investigation”, News Release, 20 
March 2018, at <bit.ly/2I3olPQ> (accessed 20 March 2018). 
38  Taylor, M, “Self-Driving Mercedes-Benzes Will Prioritize Occupant Safety over Pedestrians” Car and 
Driver, 07 October 2016, at <bit.ly/2G9MCU0> (accessed 20 March 2018).  
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suggest that manufacturers would indeed lose customers if they did not take this 
approach.39   
Of course, leaving regulation to corporations is not necessarily the best tack from 
the point of view of society generally or pedestrians in particular. Governments have 
been slow to set clear guidelines on the matter with even the US, at the forefront of 
development, merely requiring that algorithms for resolving these situations should be 
‘developed transparently using input from Federal and State regulators, drivers, 
passengers and vulnerable road users.’40 This laissez-faire view may change soon as a result 
of the events in Arizona. However, a more advanced position has already been reached 
by Germany which formed a Commission of Experts to investigate the challenges of 
autonomous vehicles. In 2016, the Commission reported back with twenty rules that car 
manufacturers must consider when developing automated driving systems.41  The 
German rules begin with the sensible position that collisions should be avoided.42 
However, where a collision is inevitable, the protection of human life takes the highest 
priority, including over damage to animals and property.43 When it comes to assessing 
potential physical injury to multiple people, general programming aimed at reducing the 
number of personal injuries is permitted however it is made clear that manufacturers are 
barred from attaching any weight to personal characteristics such as age, gender, physical 
or mental constitution.44  It is important to note one very significant limitation to the 
German rules – they do not deal with the toughest problems.  It is concluded that ‘life-
versus-life’ decisions are so abstract that general ex-ante rules cannot be imposed upon 
them.45  As a consequence, in such cases the intention is to immediately return control to 
the driver who is then faced with making the decision – although it is stipulated that such 
abrupt transfers of control should occur as seldom as possible.46 The same difficulty has 
been identified beyond Germany, with Bonnefon et al noting that defining the relevant 
algorithms presents a ‘formidable challenge.’47   
The question for present purposes is whether any of the lessons learned from the 
debate on autonomous vehicles can be carried over to autonomous weapons. The answer 
is mixed. The prioritisation model offered by manufacturers can be safely discounted for 
a number of reasons: autonomous weapons have no passengers to prioritise; the 
approach appears to have been rejected by the first state actor to set out a definitive 
position and, as will be explained shortly, the model runs contrary to humanitarian law.  
The German state’s approach, as it stands, is also incapable of adequately regulating 
autonomous weapons. By stopping short of articulating rules that deal with life-versus-
life situations and instead requiring return of control to the driver, the German rules 
exclude precisely the sort of problems that must be resolved for autonomous weapons. 
Such weapons are, by their very nature, going to be involved in situations where harm, 
desired or otherwise, is caused to humans.  Furthermore, the option of returning control 
to a human operator will not always be available if, for example, the timing is too tight or 
																																								 																				
39  Bonnefon, JF, Shariff, A and Rahwan, I, “The Social Dilemma of Autonomous Vehicles” 352 Science 
(2016) 1573, 1574. 
40  United States, Department of Transportation, Federal Automated Vehicles Policy: Accelerating the Next 
Revolution in Roadway Safety, September 2016, 26-27, at <bit.ly/2dgxqJV> (accessed 20 March 2018). 
41  Bundesministerium für Verkehr und digitale Infrastruktur, Bericht der Ethik-Kommission Automatisiertes 
und vernetztes Fahren, 20 June 2016, at <bit.ly/2IBhZZ8> (accessed 20 March 2018). 
42  Bericht der Ethik-Kommission Automatisiertes und vernetztes FahrenId, Rules 2 and 5. 
43  Bericht der Ethik-Kommission Automatisiertes und vernetztes FahrenId, Rules 2 and 7. 
44  Bericht der Ethik-Kommission Automatisiertes und vernetztes FahrenId, Rule 9.   
45  Bericht der Ethik-Kommission Automatisiertes und vernetztes FahrenId, Rule 8.   
46  Bericht der Ethik-Kommission Automatisiertes und vernetztes FahrenId, Rule 17.   
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if communication signals are being jammed. Having said that, the work done by 
Germany is promising. In permitting vehicle manufacturers to take account of the 
number of personal injuries, we can see the beginnings of a (qualified) utilitarian solution 
to the problem of competing harm which is compatible with, and arguably mandated by, 
humanitarian law. As will be explained, the various metrics proposed first by Bentham to 
explain utilitarianism could be used to provide the clearer picture of proportionality that 
is so urgently required. However, before turning to that endeavour, the substantive rule of 
proportionality in humanitarian law requires some exposition. 
 
II. Proportionality 
A. The Basics of proportionality 
Humanitarian law (or, variously, the law of war or the law of armed conflict) is typically 
viewed as having two branches. The first branch, ‘Hague law’, is the elder of the two and 
seeks to regulate the means (weapons) and methods (tactics) of warfare.  The 1868 St. 
Petersburg Declaration is an early modern example of a Hague rule that we would 
recognize today as being grounded in the principle of proportionality.48  The Declaration 
prohibited the use of projectiles weighing less than 400g that exploded upon contact with 
soft surfaces such as human flesh. The twenty state parties noted that in war, ‘it is 
sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men [and] this object would be 
exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled 
men or render their death inevitable’. The rule itself was later incorporated into the 1907 
Hague Convention.49  Today, by virtue of Additional Protocol I, Hague law takes a much 
broader view of proportionality and prohibits any means and methods of warfare that 
cause ‘superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.’50 The second branch, ‘Geneva law’, is 
more recent and seeks to protect victims of conflict such as wounded combatants,51 
civilians52 and others.  In this context, Additional Protocol I prohibits attacks that would 
cause collateral damage ‘excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.’53  Similar iterations of the proportionality principle can be found 
in a number of other humanitarian instruments such as the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons54 and the San Remo Manual (on conflicts at sea).55  
Consequently, in its heavily influential study, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross confirmed proportionality to be a customary rule of humanitarian law.56   
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The crystallisation of proportionality into a customary rule is certainly to be 
welcomed.  It acts as a restriction on states, encouraging them to adopt more moderate 
methods and means and, in certain cases, may save the lives of civilians who would 
otherwise have been caught up as ‘collateral damage’.  Furthermore, any violation of the 
principle will constitute a war crime under the Rome Statute which provides the sanction 
of individual criminal responsibility where the principle has been violated (albeit with the 
modification to ‘clearly excessive’ discussed below).57 However, it must also be 
remembered that proportionality can act as an enabler, providing states with legitimate 
sanction for particular attacks.  For these reasons, and for both attacker and target, a clear 
understanding of what the principle means is vital. It should be noted that, for present 
purposes, proportionality does not only have a bearing on autonomous weapons if they 
are deployed at some point in the future. Rather, the principle already applies to this 
nascent technology as states are obliged, in the study, development, acquisition or 
adoption of new weapons to determine whether their employment would be prohibited 
by international law.58  
 
B. The current approach to proportionality 
Vital though it is to have a clear picture of what proportionality means, understanding 
that the principle is not straightforward.59 As a starting point, it can be said that 
Additional Protocol I attempts to ensure that proportionality is assessed in the context of 
each individual ‘attack’.60 This is an attempt to confine the assessment of proportionality 
and to ensure that it relates only to the immediate objective in question: for example, the 
destruction of an enemy fuel depot. This narrow objective can be contrasted with the 
overall strategic goal of a campaign: for example, to bring about regime change.61 If the 
latter was to be used as the yardstick, then a very high number of casualties would seem 
to be ‘proportionate’ even for minor military gains. How states have approached this 
delineation issue is discussed further below. Once the ambit of the relevant attack has 
been determined, the task is then to perform the proportionality assessment proper. It will 
be recalled from above that proportionality prohibits attacks that would cause collateral 
damage which would be ‘excessive’62 or which would cause ‘unnecessary’ or 
‘superfluous’ suffering.63 However, these terms possess inherent ambiguity as it is not 
immediately clear what might be considered excessive, unnecessary or superfluous from 
one case to the next. 
The presence of ambiguity at the most fundamental level of the proportionality 
principle begs the question of how it has been capable of any meaningful application on 
the battlefield.  The answer is simple - human beings.  Human judgment has been the 
agent to imbue a flat concept with substance and to create a fully-formed and workable 
rule for any particular situation. The individuals exercising this human judgment could 
be military officers deciding on whether to launch an attack, or judges deciding if an 
attack was disproportionate. In any event, humans can be thought of as the yeast to 
proportionality’s bread and relatively recent jurisprudence confirms this. The 
																																								 																				
57  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) 2187 UNTS 90, Article 8(2)(b)(iv), at 
<bit.ly/2pHbk83> (accessed 20 March 2018) [Rome Statute]. 
58  Additional Protocol I, Article 36. 
59   See generally Newton and May, Proportionality in International Law (Oxford University Press 2014), 
chapters 5-12. 
60  Additional Protocol I, Articles 51(5) and 57(2). 
61  For a rare, overt, expression of desire for regime change, see: United States Congress, Iraq Liberation Act 
of 1998, PL 105-338, 112 Statute 3178, 31 October 1998, at <bit.ly/2pIztuS> (accessed 20 March 2018). 
62  Additional Protocol I, Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(a)(iii). 
63  Additional Protocol I, Article 35(2).   
Autonomous Weapons in Humanitarian Law: Understanding the Technology, Its__  
Compliance with the Principle of Proportionality and the Role of Utilitarianism_____	
193 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia found in Galic that, in 
assessing proportionality, ‘it is necessary to examine whether a reasonably well-informed 
person in the circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of the 
information available to him or her, could have expected excessive civilian casualties to 
result from the attack [emphasis added]’.64 In fact, beyond providing a mere mechanism 
for resolving the ambiguities inherent in proportionality, it has been argued that human 
judgments have, over time, helped to clarify the principle. As Newton and May put it, 
repeated application of proportionality by countless individuals over a long period of 
time has consolidated proportionality and there is, as a consequence, ‘a core of jus in bello 
proportionality that has remained fixed for generations.’65  This, in turn, means that 
proportionality is no longer a vague notion but, rather, a clear ‘fixed standard’ setting 
limits on what commanders and soldiers can do and removing unwanted discretion that 
might be exploited or abused.66   
If correct, this assertion is positive in the sense that it means humans operating in 
this field have a commonly understood meaning of which actions are ‘proportionate’ and 
which are ‘disproportionate’. There is, of course, a significant problem with the current 
approach. This tacit understanding shared by people is of little utility in the context of 
autonomous weapons which sees part of the implementation of proportionality delegated 
to machines. The question therefore remains as to how proportionality will work in this 
new context.   
 
C. The need for a new approach to proportionality 
It has already been explained above that, for some decades at least, there is no question 
of truly thinking machines operating in any context.67  Consequently, what we will 
certainly not see are instances of machines making ‘judgments’ about proportionality. 
Instead, modern artificial intelligence is limited to taking clearly defined rules (whereby 
any necessary judgments have already been made by humans) and then applying those 
rules to factual scenarios.68  The distinction between making judgments and applying 
judgments may seem to be a fine one, but it is important.  However, in the context of 
autonomous vehicles, the reality of trying to define algorithms that capture all of those 
judgments (and might thereby allow machines to replicate human behaviour) has proven 
to be a ‘formidable challenge.’69  This is what lay behind Germany’s retreat when 
drawing up guidelines on the matter and prompted the requirement that, in life-versus-life 
cases, the controls have to be passed back to a human.70  Again though, this option is not 
practicable in the case of autonomous weapons and so an alternative is needed. 
One reaction might be to return to the position proposed by vehicle manufacturers 
to the effect that some sort of blanket prioritisation model should be adopted –this time 
favouring one of the actors on the battlefield rather than favouring the occupant of a 
vehicle.71 However, it was indicated above that this would not be appropriate and, now 
that an exposition of proportionality has been supplied, the reason for this should be self-
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evident. Proportionality in humanitarian law involves consideration of, on one hand, any 
military advantage that an attack would deliver and, on the other, any suffering the 
attack would cause.  There must then be a check to ensure that the harm does not exceed 
the gain. A blanket presumption in favour of one side – either the target or the attacker – 
would not be compatible with this approach. Furthermore, there has been a suggestion 
by academics such as Fagnant and Kockelman that the introduction of autonomous 
vehicles will one day see the reduction of harm on the roads.72 Bennefon et al have even 
suggested that switching to ‘self-driving’ vehicles will eliminate 90% of accidents.73 In 
essence, the suggestion is that harm on the roads will one day be a moot point.  This 
belief, whether right or wrong, is simply not applicable in relation to autonomous 
weapons. Attacks are by their very nature dangerous and intended cause harm – 
eliminating harm to enemy combatants or civilians is simply not an option. Suggestions 
of incorporating black boxes into autonomous technology to record the circumstances in 
which harm occurs do not change the fact that harm will always occur.74 
The conclusion that can be drawn from all of this is that there is a need for a new, 
bespoke, approach to proportionality in relation to autonomous weapons. Experiences 
with autonomous vehicles have generally been either inapposite or under-developed. 
That said, as was noted above, Germany’s position permits manufacturers to programme 
their vehicles to assess the number of casualties that may occur in any potential crash.75 
This opens the door to a quasi-utilitarian solution to the problem that seems to offer a 
plausible way forward.  This is because proportionality is based upon the twin pillars of 
‘gain’ and ‘harm’ that are analogous to the pillars of ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’ upon which 
utilitarianism was founded by Bentham.  It is to his work that we now turn.   
 
III. Utilitarianism 
A. The theory of utilitarianism 
The classic utilitarian model of decision making is generally recognised as having first 
been expressed by Bentham as the basis for a new penal code – although similar notions 
can be traced as far back as Plato.76 Utilitarianism is satisfied by any action ‘when the 
tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to 
diminish it.’77  From the point of view of the individual, Bentham summarised utility as 
being ‘that principle which approves or disapproves of every action … according to the 
tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party 
whose interest is in question.’78 The parallel between utilitarianism and proportionality is 
eminently apparent.  Just as utilitarianism is satisfied when a given action will furnish an 
individual with more happiness than unhappiness, so too is proportionality satisfied 
when an attack will furnish the attacker with more gain than the attendant harm it will 
cause. The fact that these two principles share the same foundations offers an alluring 
prospect - that the painstaking work poured into utilitarianism by Bentham at the end of 
the eighteenth century in a bid to reform English criminal law might be used at the dawn 
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of the twenty-first century to resolve a vexed philosophical and technological question. 
There would be some poetry in that. 
Before proceeding, it is important to acknowledge that utilitarianism is not 
without its criticisms. Ayer believed that he had identified a fundamental problem with 
the principle – that it is not always contradictory to say that some pleasant things are bad, 
or that some painful things are good.79 Consequently, he argued, one cannot equate the 
fact that an action brings pleasure with it being ‘right’ or ‘desirable’ or vice versa – for 
example, a doctor might advise a patient of a terminal illness causing the latter emotional 
pain; but few would regard it as the wrong thing to do.80 Ayer thus concluded that ‘the 
validity of ethical judgements is not determined by the felicific tendencies of actions, any 
more than by the nature of people’s feelings; but that it must be regarded as ‘absolute’ or 
‘intrinsic’, and not empirically calculable.’81 Kant, for his part, favoured moral 
philosophy grounded in deontology, or the logic of duty, and so created a series of 
principles which would stand in contradistinction to utilitarianism such as ‘act only 
according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a 
universal law.’82 In addition to logical or philosophical criticisms, utilitarianism comes 
with some heavy baggage owing to its occasional adoption by politicians, medical 
professionals and others to justify ruthless actions – the eugenics programme of the 
National Socialist Party being the most heinous example.83 As a consequence, 
utilitarianism has seen a backlash that is generally based around the notion that it can be 
used to compromise the interests of the few for the benefit of the many.84   
Many of the criticisms of utilitarianism are well-founded, some less so. For 
example, some policies that purport to follow a utilitarian model are in fact based on a 
perversion of the principle twisted by those in power to achieve nefarious ends.85 In this 
sense, it is unfair to brand utilitarianism itself as inherently immoral. Indeed, Bonnefon et 
al found in the context of autonomous vehicles (through a detailed survey) that members 
of the public ‘overwhelmingly expressed a moral preference for utilitarian AVs 
programmed to minimize the number of casualties’.86  Of course, that result should be 
read against the finding that people would not actually want to buy utilitarian vehicles 
and prefer their vehicle to prioritise their own life in any scenario – although that 
probably says more about the survival instinct of humans than the morality of 
utilitarianism.87 Nonetheless, the overall picture seems to be that utilitarianism may be 
better received than one might have thought and that people are generally cognisant of 
the difficult questions new technology can bring. In truth though, the point is not to 
determine which moral philosophy has the stronger case or to defend utilitarianism – that 
task has been undertaken in myriad contexts.88 Instead, the key point is that utilitarianism 
here needs no defence.  Proportionality in humanitarian law, rightly or wrongly, simply is 
a utilitarian principle – this is a fait accompli.  The most fruitful endeavour is therefore to 
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try to understand how it might operate in the context of autonomous weapons. Germany 
side-stepped this vexing issue in relation to vehicles, essentially handing the choice back 
to the driver in difficult cases, and so it remains a lacuna that needs to be addressed. 
Fortunately, Bentham explored this issue, albeit in a very general way, and his work 
offers a starting point for ensuring that autonomous weapons comply with 
proportionality in humanitarian law.    
 
B. The hedonic calculus – gain and harm 
For Bentham, the application of utilitarianism was achieved through the ‘hedonic’ or 
‘felicific’ calculus.89 This is essentially a simple process of weighing the amount of 
pleasure and pain a given course of action will cause. To complete the calculation, one is 
required to total pleasure on one hand and pain on the other – ensuring that all those 
individuals affected, and all of the resultant effects, are captured. If the balance is on the 
side of pleasure then the act is ‘good’ (ie right). Conversely, if the balance is on the side of 
pain then the act is ‘evil’ (ie not right). This can be transposed across to proportionality: if 
the balance is on the side of military gain then the action is proportionate (and 
permitted); if the balance is on the side of harm then the action is disproportionate (and 
not permitted). Of course, we must first know what pleasures and pains we wish to weigh 
against each other.  Bentham discussed these matters and made effort to enumerate the 
various pleasures and pains that one might experience, with some of these ‘perceptions’ 
capable of manifesting as either.  The pleasures are those of sense, wealth, skill, amity, 
good name, power, piety, benevolence, malevolence, memory, imagination, expectation, 
association and relief.90   The pains are those of privation, senses, awkwardness, enmity, 
ill name, piety, benevolence, malevolence, memory, imagination, expectation and 
association.91 Some thought must be given to how these ‘pleasures’ and ‘pains’ might 
manifest in a conflict involving ‘gains’ and ‘harms’. 
Turning first to ‘gain’ or, more properly, ‘military advantage’. The starting point 
for understanding what is included here is Additional Protocol I which makes it clear 
that the parties to a conflict must distinguish between civilians and combatants and 
between civilian objects and military objectives and only direct operations only against 
military objectives.92  In other words, there is no military advantage to be had from killing 
or injuring civilians or damaging their property, so nothing of that nature would qualify 
as ‘gain’ for the purposes of the hedonic calculus. Civilians are defined negatively as any 
individuals who are not members of the armed forces, militias, volunteer corps or 
organised resistance movements and who do not spontaneously take up arms to resist 
invading forces.93  Persons falling within those categories are generally combatants and so 
are legitimate targets.94 On the other hand, military objectives are articles which by their 
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and 
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling 
at the time, offers a definite military advantage.95 Special protection is afforded to cultural 
objects, places of worship, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, 
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the natural environment and sites containing dangerous forces.96   
Of course, it is necessary to move beyond these broad notions of military 
advantage and refine them into narrower rules if the goal is to lay down clear standards 
with which autonomous weapons might comply.  However, this is difficult because, as 
Dinstein put it, ‘the spectrum of military advantage is necessarily wide’ and there is 
ambiguity over whether certain results or effects should be considered as rendering 
legitimate military advantage. 97 For example, there is some doubt over whether political 
or economic advantage garnered from an attack should be considered. At first blush, the 
answer would appear to be ‘no’ as such benefits are not strictly ‘military’ in nature.98 
However, it has been argued by Fleck that the purpose of any military action ‘must 
always be to influence the political will of the adversary.’99 Indeed, this argument was 
cited by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission when it found that an Ethiopian attack 
on a power station was proportionate partly because it was intended to exert political 
pressure on Eritrea to agree to a cease fire.100  Even if the Commission was wrong, there 
remains ambiguity over which particular articles are ‘military’. Some articles are military 
by their very nature such as tanks, command centres and munitions centres.101 However, 
ostensibly neutral articles may be capable of military use. For example, a vacant site 
which could be used as barracks for enemy combatants still qualifies on the basis of its 
potential military use in the future.102 
Turning next to ‘suffering’ and ‘harm’, again the starting point for understanding 
what is included is Additional Protocol I which provides that death, injury and property 
damage qualify.103  Again though, there are ambiguities as there is no exhaustive 
definition for what sorts of ‘injury’ fall to be measured under humanitarian law. For 
example, conflict not only causes injury by kinetic weapons but can also expose victims 
to toxic air produced by burning buildings and to psychological harm as a result of 
witnessing the aftermath of attacks.  On the latter point, Additional Protocol I includes 
reference to ‘health’ as being something distinct from injury so this suggests that there is 
scope for consideration of impact on mental health.104 Furthermore, the Protocol 
prohibits ‘all acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror’ 
and this might be seen as alluding to psychological harm.105 However, it is important to 
bear in mind that this instrument was drafted at a time when the level of attention paid to 
mental health generally was much lower than it is today and so there are limits on just 
how much one can read into these provisions without simply indulging in speculation.  
Indeed, there is good reason for states being reluctant to include psychological harm in 
the hedonic calculus as ‘from a military medical point of view the most obvious defect of 
the concept of “suffering” is that it cannot be … related to wounding’ and so is inherently 
																																								 																				
96  Additional Protocol I, Articles 53-56. 
97  Dinstein, Y, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (3rd ed, Cambridge 
University Press 2016), 106.   
98  Id, 107. 
99  Fleck, D, ed, The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press 1995), 157. 
100  Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award: Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related 
Claims, 19 December 2005, Volume XXVI, 291-349, 335, at <bit.ly/2uDOLGc> (accessed 20 March 
2018). 
101  The Conduct of Hostilities, supra nt 97, 104. 
102  Id, 107. 
103  Additional Protocol I, Article 51(5)(b). 
104  Id, Article 85(3). 
105  Id, Article 51(2). 
GroJIL 6(1) (2018), 183-202 
	
198 
harder to forecast.106 
The consequence of the above is that, although there is a relatively definite core 
when it comes to deciding what might constitute gain and harm in humanitarian law, 
lingering ambiguities remain.  It will be a matter for each individual state to resolve these 
difficulties when defining algorithms for any autonomous weapons – making countless 
decisions on what qualifies for inclusion in the hedonic calculus and what does not.  
However, utilitarianism offers a clear starting point – that all gain and all harm should be 
considered otherwise the result of the hedonic calculus and in turn, the application of 
proportionality, may be flawed. In short, the default position must be inclusion.  
Admittedly though, even if states do adopt this position, further difficulties remain to be 
overcome. 
 
C. The hedonic calculus – context 
While the task of identifying each of the various gains and harms to be included in the 
hedonic calculus presents a very complex task for states in its own right, it is not the end 
of the process.  Before a utilitarian answer can be supplied, those gains and harms must 
be weighed against each other. Weighting depends on two key points: context and 
quantification.107  Context will be considered first and, in essence, it must be recognised 
that proportionality assessments cannot be made in a vacuum. As Bradshaw et al put it, 
‘autonomy is relative to the context of activity. Functions cannot be automated 
effectively in isolation from an understanding of the task, the goals, and the context.’108   
Perhaps the most significant contextual problem with assessing proportionality 
arises when attempting to ascertain the context within which the anticipated level of 
military gain is to be measured. Again, proportionality is violated by ‘an attack which 
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof [emphasis added].’109  This indicates that, for 
example, the gain from the destruction of an ‘enemy’ tank should be the ‘friendly’ lives 
and property which might otherwise have been destroyed by that specific tank. However, 
a number of states have made declarations in respect of Additional Protocol I, or inserted 
text into their military manuals, to the effect that ‘anticipated military advantage’ is to be 
interpreted more broadly than this. For example, the UK has stated that ‘the military 
advantage anticipated from an attack is intended to refer to the advantage anticipated 
from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of the 
attack [emphasis added]’.110  Similarly, Canada has indicated that an advantage exists if 
the attack ‘will make a relevant contribution to the success of the overall operation 
[emphasis added]’.111  Many other states have promulgated this view including Australia, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Spain and the 
US.112  Under this approach, it is not the gain from the destruction of the single tank that 
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is considered but, rather, the gain from the whole operation. The operation might have 
involved the destruction of an entire military base and so that is the gain to be 
considered.  It should be noted that general, as opposed to multilateral, support for this 
position can be found in the Rome Statute which refers to the ‘direct overall military 
advantage anticipated’.113   
It seems clear that a truly utilitarian approach to proportionality favours the 
broader reading of military gain – anything less would warp the hedonic calculus by 
underestimating the potential advantage.  Of course, this is a controversial position as it 
is likely to justify greater levels of harm and, in turn, might be viewed as contrary to the 
object and purpose of humanitarian law to reduce suffering when interpreted under the 
Vienna Convention.114  Furthermore, in relation to the parallel with the Rome Statute, it 
must be conceded that this is technically only relevant to the determination of individual 
criminal responsibility and one might naturally expect a higher threshold than for 
‘normal’ international wrongs which occasion only state responsibility.  Indeed, during 
the drafting stages of the Rome Statute, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
made clear that the inclusion of the word ‘overall’ for the purposes of international 
criminal law must not be interpreted as modifying the standard under humanitarian 
law.115   
However, it is submitted that adopting the broader reading of military gain will 
not, in fact, lower the level of protection offered by humanitarian law provided that the 
overall harm caused by an attack is also considered.  This would involve taking a much 
broader view of the damaging effects an operation might have including, for example, the 
long-term physical and mental health implications for civilians who might become 
caught up in the conflict.  This approach would help to rebalance the equation and 
ensure that the result produced by the hedonic calculus remains accurate.  The problem 
at present is that states are incredibly reluctant to take a broader view of harm; but their 
position is simply perverse.  As Barber put it, there is a ‘logical inconsistency’ in taking a 
broad view of military advantage but a narrow view of suffering.116 Similarly, as 
McCormack and Mtaharu stated, ‘to the extent that mid to longer term civilian damage 
resulting from an attack is expected, such damage should be taken into account in the 
application of the proportionality equation just as the campaign-wide military advantage 
is.’117 In short, taking a fully utilitarian approach to the matter of context should favour 
neither the attacker nor those in the firing line, it should merely paint a clearer picture of 
the consequences of an attack and, in turn, permit better determinations to be made 
whether by humans or autonomous weapons. 
 
D. The hedonic calculus – quantification 
Once the relevant gains and harms expected to result from a strike have been identified 
and once they have been adequately contextualised, the final task for an autonomous 
weapon would be to quantify these factors and make the final proportionality assessment.  
However, like apples and oranges, gain and harm would appear to be incommensurable. 
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Therefore, as Walzer put it, ‘proportionality turns out to be a hard criterion to apply, for 
there is no ready way to establish an independent or stable view of the values against 
which the destruction of war is to be measured.’118  A number of authors have taken this 
apparent incommensurability to mean that proportionality assessments will remain vague 
undertakings.  For example, Schmitt stated that, while there will be situations at each 
pole of the proportionality spectrum on which there will be broad consensus, ‘the 
complexity emerges when one moves … along the proportionality continuum toward the 
centre’.119  This would be a most undesirable position as it is precisely the sort of 
stumbling block that might undermine the ability of autonomous weapons to comply 
with humanitarian law.  However, there is a solution as, according to Newton and May: 
 
The key to making proportionality manageable is to have weighing that can be 
done between things that are similar, not dissimilar whenever feasible.  It is much 
easier if the value of the military objective can be couched in terms of lives to be 
protected or saved so that the costs of such an operation, also often drawn in stark 
terms of the risk of loss of non-combatant lives, can be assessed more 
straightforwardly.120 
 
In other words, the solution to the incommensurability problem is, first, to 
measure harm as usual with reference to lives lost and injuries inflicted and, second, to 
express gain in terms of lives saved and injuries prevented.  This is an incredibly useful 
mechanism, but it only takes one so far.  It leaves open the finer detail of how to perform 
the proportionality balance.  Certainly, the gains and harms are now much more 
amenable to comparison, but how, for example, is the loss of one life to be compared to 
the prevention of a dozen serious injuries?  Again, we can turn to Bentham for guidance 
as he recognised that metrics were crucial to utilitarianism and created lists of 
‘circumstances’ (now more commonly referred to as ‘dimensions of value’) to be used 
when measuring the pleasure and pain resulting from an action.  The dimensions of value 
are as follows: 1. intensity; 2. duration; 3. certainty or uncertainty; 4. propinquity or 
remoteness; 5. fecundity (the chance of a sensation generating a later sensation of the 
same kind); 6. purity (the chance of a sensation not generating a later sensation of the 
opposite kind); and 7. extent (the number of people affected).121   
Bentham’s dimensions offer a very useful starting point to those tasked with 
developing autonomous weapons that are capable of complying with proportionality in 
humanitarian law.  Each pleasure or pain is expressed by magnitude in terms of ‘hedons’ 
and ‘dolors’ (or ‘positives’ and ‘negatives’).  These are, in a sense, the raw figures that 
form the basis of the hedonic calculus.  Admittedly, quantification in this way may seem 
crude, but there are two important points to bear in mind.  Firstly, as explained above, it 
is not the autonomous weapons themselves that will determine the values attached to, for 
example, intensity or duration of harm. Machines are incapable of that level of 
understanding and will remain so for decades; instead, human beings will be tasked with 
setting these values.122  Secondly, we should recall that precise values are already placed 
on highly sensitive matters such as human life.  In the context of statistics, there is the 
‘cost of life’ concept which is used to represent the cost of preventing death in different 
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circumstances.  For example, in 2016 the US Department of Transportation put the 
‘value of a statistical life’ at USD 9.6 Million.123  The US Environmental Protection 
Agency also uses the ‘Value of a Statistical Life’, although it is at pains to explain why 
this is not the same as placing a value on individual lives and, indeed, is seeking to move 
away from the concept.124   
The point to be taken from this is that operating the hedonic calculus in the 
context of autonomous weapons is possible. More than that, it presents significant 
opportunities as quantification removes the subjectivity associated with an individual’s 
judgment and replaces it with something more objective. Currently, proportionality 
assessments are made by human beings whose assessments might be coloured by the fact 
that they are operating in the fog of war and at personal risk.  However, quantification in 
the context of autonomous weapons would be completed before the machine is deployed, 
with the input of policy makers, lawyers, ethicists, military officers and others and can 
therefore be achieved in a more considered manner. If the results of this process can be 
brought into the light in the same way that rules of engagement are publicised, it might 
even be possible to encourage the voluntary placement by states of heavier weight on the 
side of harm and therefore reduce collateral damage. Going a step further, in working to 
protect their citizens and improve their humanitarian credentials, states could reach 
agreement on quantification either multilaterally in peacetime or bilaterally at the 
outbreak of war.  Moreover, this sort of international agreement may be essential in 
securing domestic support for autonomous weapons with, for example, the US identifying 
‘trust’ of autonomous technology as a central priority for development in this area.125 
Military operations are increasingly under the media spotlight and it is easier than ever 
before for populations to find out what actions their respective states are undertaking in 
their names.  Disproportionate attacks by autonomous systems would inevitably be 
uncovered and criticised by the press; lower the perceived trustworthiness of such 
machines in the estimation of the public (as well as military personnel using them) and 
could potentially compel states to remove them wholly or partially from the field. 126  In 
this sense, a transparent, utilitarian approach to autonomous weapons might 
simultaneously benefit both states and those caught up in armed conflict.  
 
Conclusion 
Autonomous weapons are those which can be built, programmed and then deployed to 
the battlefield to serve their function without further human involvement. The hitherto 
lack of political will to impose a pre-emptive ban, coupled with the recent deterioration in 
relations between Russia and the West, seems to confirm the inevitability of their 
adoption. This raises inter alia the difficult problem of how to ensure that their actions 
will comply with the principle of proportionality in humanitarian law. Proportionality 
requires that attacks do not result in superfluous or unnecessary suffering and, so far, the 
principle has only been applied by human beings who are able to give the abstract 
concept practical meaning in any given scenario. While autonomous weapons are 
certainly impressive pieces of technology, no software presently exists that might endow 
them with human levels of intelligence.  Instead, these machines are limited to making 
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fairly rudimentary calculations, albeit with vast amounts of information and at blistering 
speed.  The question is therefore whether machines with this limited cognitive capability 
might be capable of applying proportionality.   
The answer is a tentative ‘yes’. The starting point is that proportionality and 
utilitarianism are expressions of the same concept: they seek to promote pleasure over 
pain and gain over harm respectively. As a result, proportionality can learn much from 
utilitarianism.  In particular, utilitarianism shows us that assessments can be made using 
the ‘hedonic calculus’ but that, in order for the result to be accurate, there must be a 
willingness to include all of the relevant gains and harms rather than cherry picking some 
and ignoring others. Thus, while the current approach of certain states in assessing the 
‘overall’ military advantage is appropriate, it must be matched with an assessment of the 
overall harm caused too. Utilitarianism also requires that those developing autonomous 
weapons must be able to assign values to each element on a battlefield if the calculus is to 
be completed. This can be achieved in terms of lives saved and lives lost, and there are 
past examples of states having ascribed specific values to human life, so the task is 
possible. 
Aspects of utilitarianism might seem cold, however that is simply the law as it 
currently stands – proportionality is a utilitarian concept.  Having said that, in this 
context it does in fact present an opportunity to raise the protection afforded to those 
embroiled in conflict.  Rather than having proportionality assessments conducted by 
individual humans whose judgment will inevitably be clouded by the fog of war, the 
parameters are set in advance of the conflict by teams of individuals working together 
calmly as a collective.  Hopefully, the necessary debates and conversations would result 
in a trend toward greater emphasis on humanitarianism. Furthermore, autonomous 
weapons would merely implement those parameters without the same desire for self-
preservation or survival that can skew the application of proportionality when 
undertaken by humans.  This more precise, mathematical, approach to proportionality 
could be exploited to its fullest if states work together to place greater weight on harm 
and thereby raise the bar that must be met before an autonomous weapon would engage 
in an attack.  These sorts of agreements might represent a more achievable goal than the 
seemingly doomed discussions of a ban. 
Funnily enough, Bentham himself did not think it would ever be possible to apply 
utilitarianism with mathematical precision to every judgment. Of course, he was writing 
well before an ‘information age’ in which calculations can be performed at high speed by 
machines fitted-out with microprocessors. Technology has finally caught up with 
Bentham; and society should make the most of it. 
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